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ABSTRACT 
The federal law that guarantees an appropriate and inclusive education 
for children with disabilities relies on private enforcement; parents 
concerned about the inadequacy of their children’s education can take 
advantage of an administrative hearing to seek resolution of disputes with 
the child’s school district. While conceived in the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as a prompt and informal tool, evidence 
suggests that special education due process hearings have become overly 
complex, prohibitively expensive, and excessively lengthy, thus limiting 
their accessibility and usefulness as an enforcement mechanism.  
Despite numerous studies highlighting the flaws of special education 
due process, few have taken advantage of a particularly important resource 
for crafting reform proposals: the attorneys who practice special education 
law. Tapping into practitioners’ lived experiences of special education due 
process provides us with a clearer sense of how the due process system plays 
out in practice and, importantly, how differing perceptions of the system’s 
flaws may facilitate or impede attempts to build support for particular 
reforms.  
In addition to cataloging various features of the due process system that 
differ from state to state, this article reports data from a nationwide survey 
of practicing special education lawyers that elicited their views about the 
effectiveness of the due process system. The most salient observation 
obtained from the survey is that the attorney’s client—be it the parents or 
the school district—strongly shapes the attorney’s perceptions of the 
system’s flaws and targets for change. Yet the results also suggest a number 
of reforms that could improve and streamline the system while garnering 
support from both parents and school districts. Recommendations include 
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(1) more rigorous training of hearing officers, both in terms of case
management and substantive special education law; (2) publication at the
state level of more comprehensive and uniform standards for procedure,
discovery, and admission of evidence; (3) development of additional
funding sources for parent attorneys and expert witnesses; and (4) state
review of rules with an eye toward greater procedural simplicity.
INTRODUCTION 
Since the passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) in 1975, parents of children with disabilities have had the ability to 
request due process hearings to resolve disputes between parents and school 
districts regarding the special educational programming provided to their 
children.1 While the basic idea of an administrative hearing before a hearing 
officer has been a consistent pillar of the IDEA over the past forty-five years, 
the effectiveness of the due process hearing to resolve disputes between 
parents and school districts is a perennial concern.  
The leading complaints concerning the due process system are its 
complexity and expense.2 While parents and child advocates have expressed 
dismay that the due process system is financially out of reach for most 
families,3 school administrators have suggested that the due process system 
is burdensome and costly for school districts as well.4 Observations about 
the increasing “judicialization” of due process procedures have been the 
subject of many studies,5 as have many diverse recommendations for 
1 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, often referred to as PL 94-142, was 
the original title of the law now entitled the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. When passed, 
the law required states to provide parents the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing conducted 
by the State educational agency or the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit. Parties 
to the hearing were given the right to be accompanied by counsel, compel the attendance of witnesses, 
present evidence, cross examine opposing witnesses, obtain a written decision with findings of fact, and 
obtain a transcript of the hearing. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, §§ 615(b)(2), 615(d), 89 Stat. 773, 788–89 (1975). 
2 See, e.g., Tracy Gershwin Mueller, Litigation and Special Education: The Past, Present, and 
Future Direction for Resolving Conflicts Between Parents and School Districts, 26(3) J. DISABILITY 
POL’Y STUD. 135, 137 (2015) (referencing numerous concerns about due process in published 
commentaries).  
3 See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413 (2011); Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How 
IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education 
Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2011). 
4 See Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADMIN.
(April 2016),  
https://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Educatio
n/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf 
5 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in 
Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 
(2007).  
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change.6 
Notably, despite numerous studies highlighting the flaws of special 
education due process, few have explored the experiences and perceptions 
of the attorneys who practice special education law in order to gain insight 
into the flaws of due process and to lead policymakers to potential solutions. 
Those that have sought input and observations from practicing attorneys 
focused on a particular state (Pennsylvania) or, although national in scope, 
limited the discussion to attorney attitudes toward a narrow set of topics 
(resolution sessions, IEP facilitation, binding arbitration, and the two-tier 
system).7 As a contribution to the effort to analyze more fully the efficacy 
of due process as a mechanism for dispute resolution, we undertook a 
national survey of practicing special education lawyers that tapped into 
attorneys’ attitudes regarding the overall complexity, accessibility, and 
effectiveness of the due process system in their state. In addition, we asked 
respondents to share their thoughts about the use of formal discovery and 
expert witnesses in special education due process. We also provided 
respondents with an opportunity to share their recommendations for how 
best to improve the due process system.  
As described more fully in this article, the survey results bore out the 
continued concern of many that the due process system is problematic. In 
answer to survey questions, lawyers found fault with the knowledge and 
objectivity of hearing officers, the length of hearings, the pressure put on the 
system by attorney and expert witness fees, and the overall complexity of 
due process hearings.  Most notable, however, were the very distinct 
differences in the perceptions of the attorneys who represent school districts 
and the attorneys who represent parents. While attorneys on both sides of 
special education disputes expressed some level of dissatisfaction with the 
process, each group perceived the flaws in fundamentally different ways.  
School district attorneys tended to see the high cost of plaintiff’s attorney 
fees (which school districts must bear if parents prevail, due to the fee-
shifting provisions of the IDEA) as an intractable problem limiting the 
efficient resolution of cases. In contrast, parent attorneys focused more on 
the cost of expert witnesses (the cost of which is not shifted to districts, even 
if parents prevail) as a barrier to parents trying to access the due process 
system and find resolution to their disputes. Both groups of attorneys 
identified issues with hearing officers as interfering with the effectiveness 
of due process, with school lawyers more likely to raise concerns about their 
lack of skills and knowledge and parent lawyers more concerned about 
perceived bias. 
6 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Shaver, Every Day Counts: Proposals to Reform IDEA’s Due Process 
Structure, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2015); S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012). 
7 Zirkel, supra note 5 at 28, 30 n.14, 50 n.85.
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Despite these differing perceptions, however, the attorney responses 
suggested that a number of reforms could garner general support.8  First, 
reforms targeting the quality and objectivity of hearing officers would invite 
greater faith in the system. State education agencies could begin by looking 
seriously at how they choose, pay, and train hearing officers, with an eye 
toward assuring that hearing officers are well versed in both hearing 
management and substantive special education law, and are not biased 
toward one side or the other. Second, states should revisit their rules to 
ensure that they have developed and published clear standards for procedure, 
discovery, and admission of evidence. This would leave less to the discretion 
of hearing officers and would create a more uniform and predictable 
experience for all parties. Third, federal, state, and local educational 
authorities should explore funding sources to support legal organizations 
that provide free or low-cost representation to parents and to fund needed 
experts. This would ease the financial pressures that often prevent all but the 
wealthiest of parents from pursuing due process and reduce the high cost of 
due process for all parties. Finally, states should examine their choices about 
due process to eliminate as much procedural complexity as possible by 
considering such changes as putting time limits on hearings and limiting 
discovery. 
The article is organized in five parts. Part I provides relevant background 
information on special education due process hearings, which are required 
by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for dispute resolution 
between parents and school districts. Part II reviews previous work done on 
this topic, focusing specifically on the few studies that have surveyed special 
education practitioners with due process experience. Part III reports the 
results from an original national survey of special education lawyers 
conducted in late 2019 and early 2020. Part IV provides an analysis of the 
results and makes recommendations. Part V concludes by acknowledging 
how intractable the problems with due process have been and focusing on 
the recommendations that might have the best chance of success.   
 
I. DUE PROCESS UNDER THE IDEA 
The IDEA is the primary federal law governing the education of children 
with disabilities. In return for federal funding, states commit to 
implementing a special education program that accords with the Act’s 
 
8 While a variety of reform proposals might generate considerable support from either parent 
attorneys or school attorneys, we have focused on proposals that might find broad consensus and thus 
have a better chance of implementation. 
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mandates.9 Eligible students aged three through twenty-one are guaranteed 
a “free appropriate public education”10 (FAPE) in the least restrictive 
environment (LRE). Once a child has been identified as eligible, the school 
district must respond appropriately to the child’s unique needs by 
developing an Individualized Education Program (IEP). An IEP is a written 
plan that sets forth the child’s present levels of performance; the child’s 
strengths and weaknesses; the measurable annual goals the child is expected 
to attain; the programs and services the child will receive to address their 
learning needs; and classroom and testing accommodations and 
modifications.11  
Due to the inherent vagueness in the terms “free appropriate public 
education” and “least restrictive environment,” parents and school districts 
sometimes disagree on what special education services and placement a 
child should receive under the law. Recognizing this, the IDEA provides 
several dispute resolution tools to help resolve differences of opinion, one 
of which is a due process hearing.12 The law requires states to establish a 
hearing process that allows any party to present a complaint related to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the 
provision of FAPE.13 A hearing to address the complaint must be held by an 
impartial hearing officer; parties have the right to be represented by counsel, 
present evidence and witnesses, cross-examine opposing witnesses, and 
compel the attendance of witnesses.14 The hearing officer is obliged to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, issue a written decision that 
determines whether a violation of the IDEA has occurred and, if a violation 
has occurred, award appropriate relief. The law also guarantees the right of 
a party disagreeing with the hearing officer’s decision to bring a civil action 
in state or federal court.15 If the parent prevails, the law allows the court to 
require the school district to pay the parent’s costs and attorney fees (but not 
the costs of any expert witnesses).16 
Although all states must adhere to those core provisions of the IDEA, as 
 
9 While the term “states” is used throughout, it is meant to include other jurisdictions that receive 
funding for special education through the IDEA, including the District of Columbia and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. 
10 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2018) (“A free appropriate public education” is defined as special education 
and related services provided in conformity with an individualized education program for a child with a 
disability); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1982) (requiring states to provide only a 
minimum floor of educational opportunity to students, not the best education possible).  
11 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2018). 
12 The full list of formal dispute resolution tools includes facilitated IEP meetings, mediation, state 
complaints, and due process petitions. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2018). 
13 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2018). 
14 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (2018). 
15 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (2018). 
16 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)–(3) (2018). 
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well as timelines by which certain events must take place,17 they have 
considerable room for customizing the due process framework to suit the 
state’s particular needs.18 Some of the areas open to customization include 
the statute of limitations period,19 the use of a one-tier or two-tier 
administrative review system,20 the allocation of the burden of proof,21 the 
use of discovery rules, the use of evidence rules,22 qualifications and 
employment of hearing officers,23 regulations concerning permissible 
representation,24 and timelines for filing in federal court.25  
In some of these areas, the states have largely converged on the same 
practice. For instance, forty-four states have set the statute of limitations 
period at two years. Thus, a due process hearing must be requested within 
two years of the date the parent or district knew or should have known about 
the alleged violation of the IDEA. Five states (Alaska, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin) have restricted the statute of limitations 
period to one year, while only Kentucky has extended it to three years.26 
Similarly, forty-three states have chosen to implement a one-tier 
administrative review system as opposed to a two-tier system. In one-tier 
systems, the state department of education conducts the hearing and the 
losing party can then appeal to state or federal court. In two-tier systems, the 
hearing is conducted by the local educational agency, and the losing party 
can then appeal to the state department of education, which will appoint a 
 
17 For instance, school districts must schedule a resolution meeting between the parents and school 
district within fifteen calendar days of receiving a due process complaint, unless both the parent(s) and 
school district agree in writing not to have a resolution meeting or to use mediation instead. The State 
Education Agency (SEA) or the public agency directly responsible for the child’s education must also 
ensure that, no later than forty-five days after the thirty-day resolution period expires, a final decision is 
reached in the hearing and a copy of the decision is mailed to each party. 
18 This approach has been described as “cooperative federalism.” See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 
49, 52 (2005) (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
19 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (2018). 
20 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g)(1), (i)(2)(A) (2018). 
21 The IDEA is silent on which party bears the burden of proof at a due process hearing, though 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schaffer interpreted the IDEA as placing the burden of proof on the party 
seeking relief, which is nearly always the parent. Nevertheless, some states have assigned the burden to 
the school district. 
22 The IDEA does not specify whether the rules of civil procedure or the rule of evidence must be 
used in a due process hearing.  
23 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(3)(A)(i)–(iv) (2018). 
24 The IDEA provides parents with the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and 
individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children with disabilities. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1) (2018). 
25 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2018). 
26 Alaska has a one-year statute of limitations for parents and a sixty-day statute of limitations for 
school districts. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (2008); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(a) (2007); 
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 1511(F) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(b) (2006); 19 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 89.1151(c) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 115.80(1)(a)(1) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. § 157.224(6) (2004). 
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review officer or review panel.27 Only after the review officer or panel issues 
a decision can the losing party appeal to state or federal court. Those states 
with a two-tier system are Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Nevada, New 
York, Ohio, and South Carolina.28  
Another area in which the majority of states have converged on the same 
practice is the allocation of the burden of proof. In 2005, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the party requesting a due process hearing bears the burden of 
proof under the IDEA unless a state enacts legislation to the contrary.29 The 
majority of states have declined (despite pressure from parents and 
advocates) to pass such legislation. Because the vast majority of due process 
cases are initiated by parents,30 they typically bear the burden in the states 
that have not specifically shifted it to school districts.31 Only six states— 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, New Jersey, Nevada, and New York— 
place the burden of proof on the school district.32 
More variation exists among the states when it comes to rules about 
representation, hearing officer qualification, use of formal discovery, rules 
of civil procedure, and rules of evidence. For example, the IDEA provides 
that parties have “the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and 
by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the 
problems of children with disabilities[.]”33 Whether or not this right extends 
to allow parents to be represented by special education advocates, rather than 
only by licensed attorneys, has not been addressed by Congress or the 
Supreme Court. The regulation of the practice of law, which includes 
unauthorized practice rules, is determined at the state level. Thus, states can 
 
27 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(g) (2018). 
28 Since 1991, the trend has moved toward one-tier systems. See Connolly et al., State Due Process 
Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: An Update, 30 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 156, 157 (2019) 
(summarizing trend and reporting that in 1991, twenty-six states were using a two-tier system; by 2010, 
nine states were using two tiers; in 2020, just seven states use two tiers). See E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. 
Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. Of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 2014) (upholding North Carolina’s two-
tier system).  
29 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61–62 (2005). 
30 A school district might file a complaint to defend the appropriateness of its evaluation when the 
parent is seeking an independent educational evaluation or to challenge a parent’s refusal to consent to 
special education services. Nevertheless, such complaints are rare. 
31 See Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of Persuasion in Impartial Hearings Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 1 (2013) (discussing the burden 
of proof in due process cases); Thomas A. Mayes et al., Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative 
and Judicial Proceedings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27 
(2005). 
32 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140 (1983); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 1008.212 (2013) (placing burden on school district only with respect to expedited hearings); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. 388.467 (2015); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(c) 
(McKinney 2007) (placing the burden of production and persuasion on the district except in cases 
involving tuition reimbursement when the parent unilaterally places their child in private school).  
33 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1) (2018).  
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determine the role of a non-attorney in due process hearings. Eleven states 
allow non-attorney advocates to represent parents in a due process hearing.34 
The process for hiring and qualifying hearing officers is mostly 
controlled at the state level. The federal law requires that hearing officers 
possess knowledge of and have an ability to understand the law, regulations, 
and court decisions; possess the ability to conduct hearings; and possess the 
ability to render and write decisions consistent with the law.35 The officers 
may not be an employee of the state or local educational agency (LEA) 
involved in the child’s education or care and may not have a personal or 
professional conflict of interest.36 This leaves states with the option to have 
hearings heard by panels or individuals, by lawyers or by non-lawyers, and 
by people with particular expertise in special education or lacking in such 
knowledge.37 Hearing officers can be full or part-time and may or may not 
be part of a state system for administrative hearings.38  
Presently, administrative law judges (ALJs) preside over special 
education due process hearings in seventeen states.39 Among the thirty-three 
states that do not use ALJs, many have simply adopted the IDEA’s 
requirements for hearing officers and left it at that. But other states have 
 
34 With the sole exception of Texas (89 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §1175 (2018)), state statutes and codes 
uniformly fail to explicitly state whether or not attorney advocates are permitted to represent parents in 
a due process hearing. We reached out to the relevant state education departments by phone and email to 
determine whether or not advocate representation was allowed. All email responses are on file with the 
authors. In states where the rules are not specific about the right to be represented by a non-attorney in a 
due process hearing, the non-attorney advocates risk prosecution for the unauthorized practice of law. 
See In re Arons, 756 A.2d 867, 874 (Del. 2000) (finding neither the IDEA nor the due process clause of 
the U.S. Constitution gives parents the right to be represented by lay advocates in special education 
administrative hearings and affirming the decision of the Delaware Board on Unauthorized Practice of 
Law that the lay advocate in a due process case was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).  
35 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2018). 
36 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i) (2018). 
37 And although the IDEA does not say anything about staying up to date on special education law 
and developments, some states require hearing officers to undergo periodic refresher training to maintain 
their credentials (e.g., Tennessee (TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-10-606 (2019)) and Wisconsin (WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE PI § 11.12 (2021)). 
38 See Connolly, Zirkel & Mayes, supra note 29, at 158–60 (cataloging the various choices states 
have made with regard to employment status, organizational home, background, and assignment method 
of due process hearing officers. The authors highlight the trend toward the use of full-time hearing 
officers and the use of attorneys rather than special educational professionals as hearing officers). 
39 Arizona (ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §7-2-405 (2021)), California (CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§56501(b)(4)(1992)), Colorado (1 C.C.R.  301-8:2220-R-6.02 (2013)), Florida (FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 
6A-6.03311(2014)), Georgia (GA COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4-7-.12(2010)), Hawaii (HAW. CODE R. § 8-
60-65(2009)), Iowa (IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.511(256B,34CFR300) (2021)), Louisiana (LA. 
ADMIN CODE. tit. 28, Pt XLIII, §511(2012)), Maryland (MD CODE. ANN., EDUC., §8-413)(2016)), 
Michigan (MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1724f)(2020), Minnesota (MINN. R., 3525.3900 (2014)), North 
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-109.6 (2006)), North Dakota (N.D. ADMIN. CODE 67-23-05-02 
(2008)), New Jersey (N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7 (2020)), Oregon (OR. ADMIN. R. 581-015-2365 
(2007)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-10-606 (2019)), and Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
392-172A-05085 (2007).  
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added additional requirements. For example, Louisiana, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Texas require hearing officers to have a law 
degree; Oklahoma requires hearing officers to have either a law degree or a 
master’s degree in education, special education, psychology, or another 
related field.40 Delaware has taken a particularly creative approach by 
requiring that due process hearings be overseen by a hearing panel consisting 
of three members appointed on a rotating basis. The panel must include a 
Delaware attorney, an educator knowledgeable in the field of special 
education, and a lay person with a demonstrated interest in the education of 
children with disabilities and approved by the Governor’s Advisory Council 
for Exceptional Children.41  
Finally, the IDEA states that any party to a due process hearing has the 
right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the 
attendance of witnesses,42 as well as prohibit the introduction of any 
evidence at the hearing that was not disclosed to that party at least five 
business days before the hearing.43 The IDEA is silent, however, as to 
whether formal discovery should be available to parties, or whether the 
hearing will be conducted according to the court rules of civil procedure and 
evidence. Although due process hearings under the IDEA are not meant to 
be overly formal and were originally expected to be “commenced and 
disposed of as quickly as practicable,”44 there is evidence that due process 
hearings are quite like complex civil trials in many places.45 Presently, 
twelve states use formal discovery in due process hearings, while eight states 
use the rules of civil procedure and eight states use the rules of evidence.46 
 
40 LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 28, Pt XLIII, § 511 (2012); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE 20-81-210 (2010); WIS. 
ADMIN. CODE PI § 11.12 (1998); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 210:15-13-5 (2008); W. VA. CODE R. § 126-16-
1 (2017) (details concerning hearing officers detailed in 126-16 Attachment); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 
89.1170. In contrast, South Carolina seems to set the bar rather low, requiring that a hearing officer be at 
least twenty-one years of age and a high school graduate. Office of Special Educ. Servs, South Carolina 
State Dep’t of Educ., SPECIAL EDUCATION PROCESS GUIDE FOR SOUTH CAROLINA (2013), 
https://ed.sc.gov/districts-schools/special-education-services/state-regulations/special-ed-process-
guide-sepg-2013/ 
41 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 926.11.2, 11.4 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 3137(d) (2012).  
42 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(h) (2018). 
43 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2017). 
44 See 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975). 
45 See, e.g., Zirkel et. al, supra note 5.   
46 Of the states that allow for discovery, the rules of civil procedure, and/or evidence, only a few 
explicitly state as such in their state administrative codes. For those states’ whose statutes and regulations 
are silent, we relied upon phone calls to the appropriate state divisions (either the state education 
department or the office of administrative hearings) and also the attorney responses to our surveys. The 
twelve states that permit formal discovery are: Colorado (1 COLO. CODE REGS § 104-1(2014)), Florida, 
Iowa ((IOWA ADMIN. CODE 281-41.1010(5) (17A,256B)), Indiana (511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-7), 
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. § 13B.080), Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana (MONT. ADMIN. R. 
10.16.3513), North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The eight states in which the 
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Three states (Indiana, North Carolina, and South Dakota) use formal 
discovery, the rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence.47   
The following graphs reflect the practices in the states: 
 
Statute of Limitations 
 
Two Tier v. One Tier Appeal 
 
 
rules of civil procedure are used are: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas (19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185), Tennessee, and Wyoming.  
47 It is worth highlighting here the difficulty which the authors experienced when trying to establish 
whether a state uses discovery, the rules of procedure, and/or the rules of evidence. Some attorney 
respondents to our survey indicated that their state uses the formal rules of discovery and or the rules of 
civil procedure and evidence, even though the state codes were silent on this matter. This suggests that 
even when a state does not explicitly require the use of formal discovery or the rules of civil procedure 
and evidence, individual hearing officers may have discretion to allow discovery and to employ the 
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II. LISTENING TO SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEYS 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the flexibility accorded to states 
under the IDEA means that the experience of parties engaged in a due 
process hearing can vary significantly depending on the state in which they 
are located. Yet despite such differences, the literature on due process 
hearings speaks to a common theme that transcends state boundaries: the 
due process system is not living up to expectations. Indeed, over the past 
twenty-five years, there has been a steady stream of studies highlighting 
various flaws of the due process system.48 The general take away is that the 
 
48 See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 6 (proposing that IDEA include a process for voluntary, binding 
arbitration); Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403, 409–13 (1994) (proposing a five-step reform that would enhance the 
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system is inefficient, prohibitively expensive, and time-consuming.49  
Despite what is now a sizable literature critiquing special education due 
process, there are still very few studies that explore the experiences and 
perceptions of the attorneys practicing special education “on the ground.” A 
review of the literature found only two such studies: one by Kevin 
Hoagland-Hanson and one by Elizabeth Shaver.50 Hoagland-Hanson’s study 
focused on due process hearings in Pennsylvania and consisted of interviews 
with four members of the Pennsylvania special education bar, all of whom 
represented parents, as well as an empirical analysis of due process hearing 
outcomes in the state. In contrast, Shaver fielded a nationwide survey of 
special education attorneys that focused on practitioners’ views concerning 
the effectiveness of the resolution session prior to a due process hearing, the 
desirability of IEP facilitation, the possibility of amending the IDEA to 
allow for voluntary, binding arbitration for special education disputes, and 
the costs and benefits of a two-tier system versus a one-tier system.  
Interestingly, the results of Shaver’s nationwide survey reflected the 
same phenomenon revealed in the survey reported here: attorney attitudes 
towards certain aspects of special education due process appear to depend 
heavily upon whether the attorney represents parents or school districts. For 
instance, Shaver found that school district attorneys were considerably more 
positive in evaluating the use of IEP facilitation as a means to resolve 
disputes and avoid the filing of a due process complaint than were parent 
attorneys. Sixty percent of school district attorneys felt that IEP facilitation 
was a “valuable vehicle to resolve disagreements quickly,” but only thirty-
three percent of parent attorneys agreed.51 School district attorneys were also 
more positive about the use of the resolution session as a means to resolve 
disputes; forty-one percent of school district attorneys reported that the 
resolution session was a “valuable vehicle” but only eighteen percent of 
parent attorneys felt the same.52  
Notably, however, Shaver’s study suggested that areas of commonality 
do exist between attorneys on both sides. Both school district and parent 
attorneys agreed that IEP facilitation was a good idea in the abstract, but that 
its potential was often lost in the implementation. Attorneys on both sides 
 
49 Hyman et al., supra note 3; Pasachoff, supra note 3; Pudelski, supra note 4.  
50 Hoagland-Hanson, supra note 7; Shaver, supra note 6. Other studies have interviewed or 
surveyed school parents, school administrators, and state special education directors. See, e.g., J. Michael 
Havey, School Psychologists’ Involvement in Special Education Due Process Hearings, 36(2) PSYCHOL. 
IN THE SCHS. 117 (1999) (interviewing school psychologists involved in due process hearings); Steven 
S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Evaluating the Fairness of Special Education Hearings, 57(6) 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD 546 (1991) (interviewing parents and school officials in Pennsylvania); Ann C. 
Candler & Eddie W. Henderson, Procedural Due Process in Special Education: A Survey of Directors 
of Special Education, 14 AM. SECONDARY EDUC. 20 (1984) (surveying special education directors).  
51 Shaver, supra note 6, at 181. 
52 See id. at 1845. 
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indicated that the success of IEP facilitation was highly dependent on the 
facilitator’s skills and training; a good facilitator could make all the 
difference and possibly help the parties avoid the filing of a due process 
complaint. Based on her findings, Shaver recommended that Congress 
develop guidelines for training IEP facilitators so that they have conflict 
resolution skills as well as substantive understanding of special education 
teaching methodologies and best practices for writing IEPs.53  
For those seeking improvements to the special education due process 
system, the experience and perceptions of attorneys represent an important 
resource. By tapping into practitioner’s lived experiences of special 
education due process, we can gain a better sense of how the due process 
system plays out in practice and, importantly, how differing perceptions of 
the system’s flaws may facilitate or impede attempts to build support for 
particular reforms. Parents and school districts face different challenges and 
concerns; these differences undoubtedly affect how they— and their 
attorneys— experience and evaluate due process. Finding commonly-held 
perceptions, values, and goals among the attorneys on both sides, however, 
could lead toward reforms that can be embraced more readily across the 
board. 
III. SURVEYING SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEYS 
The survey reported here builds on prior studies by examining attorney 
attitudes towards the overall complexity, accessibility, and effectiveness of 
due process. Conducted in late 2019 and early 2020, the survey questioned 
attorneys throughout the country in order to identify certain aspects of due 
process that might be important factors contributing toward the perception 
that due process is too complex.54 Specifically, the survey asked lawyers 
about their experiences with formal discovery, the rules of procedure, the 
rules of evidence, and the use of expert witnesses. In addition, it sought their 
perceptions and attitudes towards the aspects of due process that could be 
affecting the accessibility of special education due process. It provided 
multiple opportunities for the participating attorneys to provide narrative 
comments and recommendations, potentially leading toward more targeted 
and effective reforms.  
All respondents were contacted through email; several national 
organizations agreed to send the survey invitation to their respective email 
 
53 Id. at 193–94. 
54 Complexity is used in this context to refer to a process that is difficult to navigate because of 
numerous legal rules and procedures, lengthy hearings, the need for sophisticated evidence, and the like. 
Excessive complexity can delay resolution of the issue, often leaving a child’s educational needs unmet 
for an extended period of time. 
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lists.55  Those lists were supplemented with Google searches to find email 
addresses of attorneys who practice special education law.56 The survey 
specifically solicited responses from lawyers with experience in special 
education due process hearings; those without such experience would likely 
have declined to respond.57 
The survey contained thirty-six questions,58 four of which were open-
ended questions inviting comments on particular aspects of due process 
hearings. The first section of the survey gathered basic information on each 
respondent, including where and for how long the attorney had been 
practicing, whether the attorney typically represented school districts or 
parents in special education matters, and how many due process cases the 
attorney had handled. Respondents were then asked about their use of 
discovery and expert witnesses, and about whether certain procedures were 
used in the state (i.e., rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, 
representation by non-attorneys). Finally, a series of questions sought 
observations about the accessibility of due process to parents seeking to 
resolve special education disputes. At multiple points in the survey, 
respondents were invited to include narrative comments. In particular, 
respondents were given the option of providing comments on the use of 
expert witnesses, the use of discovery, the effectiveness of pro se 
representation for parents, and the effectiveness of attorney representation 
for parents.59 At the end of the survey, respondents were given the 
opportunity to provide ideas for improving due process in special 
education.60 
 
55 Three organizations graciously agreed to send the survey to members: 1) The National Disability 
Rights Network; 2) Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates; and 3) National School Boards 
Association. Two additional lists in North Carolina were used, one of school board lawyers and one of 
parent lawyers. 
56 Recipients who did not respond within a week of receiving the survey were provided one 
reminder. 
57 Likely for this reason, our sample size is slightly less than half of Elizabeth Shaver’s 2015 study. 
Indeed, while the number of lawyers practicing special education law in the U.S. is small, the number 
with experience in special education due process is likely even smaller. In North Carolina, for example, 
in 2018, just nine lawyers represented the parents in all of the due process hearings held in the state 
(except the pro se cases) and just fourteen lawyers represented the school districts. Analysis done by the 
authors based on state reports of the 16 due process cases that resulted in final hearing decisions. See Due 
Process Hearings, PUB. SCHS. OF N. CAROLINA: STATE BD. OF EDUC., DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 
https://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/parent-resources/dispute-resolution/due-process-hearings  (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2021). 
58 The survey was designed to be completed within five to fifteen minutes depending upon how 
much time the attorney wished to spend answering the open-ended questions. 
59 These comments remain on file with the authors.  
60 Respondents were also given the option to provide their contact information if they were 
interested and available for a one-on-one interview. For confidentiality reasons, these names will not be 
shared.  
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A. Respondent Demographics 
A total of 175 attorneys from forty-three states and two additional 
jurisdictions completed the survey.61 Table 1 provides the breakdown of 
respondents across states; slightly more than half of the states had one to 
three respondents, and only seven states had seven or more respondents.62 
Ninety-eight attorneys representing parents, seventy-four representing 
school districts, and three attorneys representing both parents and school 
districts participated in the survey.63  
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the respondents came with varied levels of 
experience.  Nearly half of the respondents had practiced special education 
law for more than fifteen years.  Sixteen percent reported having practiced 
special education law for eleven to fifteen years; nearly twenty percent for 
six to ten years, and about twenty percent for zero to five years. When it 
came to experience specifically with due process cases (Figure 2), about half 
had handled more than twenty cases, while twelve percent reported having 
handled eleven to twenty cases, sixteen percent reported six to ten cases, and 
just over twenty percent reported zero to five cases. Those attorneys with the 
greatest experience in due process cases practiced in a wide range of states.64 
The states with the most attorneys who have handled more than twenty due 
process cases were Arizona (5), California (5), District of Columbia (4), 
Maryland (5), North Carolina (5), New Jersey (7), Ohio (4), and Texas (8). 
Not surprisingly, most of these attorneys practice in states with high 
numbers of due process cases (California, District of Columbia, Maryland, 




61 Not every respondent answered every question; therefore, some questions record fewer than 177 
responses. 
62 Those attorneys who reported practicing in multiple states (n=19) were asked to indicate which 
state they would be referring to when completing the survey.  
63 Three attorneys indicated they represented both types of clients.  
64 AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KY, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MT, NC, 
NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, TX, VA, WA. 
65 IDEA Data Brief: Due Process Complaints/Hearings, CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOL.. 
IN SPECIAL EDUC. (May 2017),  
https://www.cadreworks.org/sites/default/files/resources/CADRE%20DPC%20Brief_WebFinal_6.201
7.pdf 
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Figure 2: Number of Due Process Cases Handled 
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Table 1: Number of Respondents by State 




























































B. Attorney Perceptions of Overall Complexity, Accessibility, & 
Effectiveness of Due Process Hearings 
The first substantive portion of the survey focused on attorneys’ 
perceptions of the overall complexity, accessibility, and effectiveness of due 
process. Although due process was originally meant to provide parents with 
a prompt and informal tool for dispute resolution,66 previous studies— as 
 
66 See 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (The remarks of Senator Harrison Williams Jr. included the 
following statement, “I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters regarding the education 
program of a handicapped child is extremely detrimental to his development. The interruption or lack of 
the required special education and related services can result in a substantial setback to the child's 
development. Thus, in view of the urgent need for prompt resolution of questions involving the education 
of handicapped children it is expected that all hearings and reviews conducted pursuant to these 
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well as vocal complaints by parents and their advocates— suggest that 
special education due process may not be meeting the mark.  
a. Complexity 
Respondents were asked to rate their state’s due process hearing system 
on a scale of one to ten, with one being a simple administrative hearing and 
ten a complex civil trial. Figure 3 presents the results, aggregated across 
attorney type. Of the 149 respondents who answered this question, less than 
ten percent (28) reported a score of four or lower.67 About half of the 
respondents (51% or 76) reported a score between five and seven. Nearly a 
third of the respondents (30% or 45) reported a score of eight or higher.  The 
average score of all respondents was 6.33, with a median score of 6.  These 
responses are consistent with previous research that has documented the 
increased “judicialization” of due process hearings.68  
 
 
provisions will be commenced and disposed of as quickly as practicable consistent with a fair 
consideration of the issues involved.”); C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Henderson Cty., 241 F.3d 
374, 381 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]hese rights [to a due process hearing and judicial review] were created to 
supply a simple and efficient method to encourage parental participation and facilitate parental 
enforcement of the IDEA.”). 
67 Again, not all respondents answered all questions. Thus, our percentages are based on the number 
of attorneys responding to a given question, not the overall number of attorneys who participated in the 
survey.  
68 Zirkel et. al, supra note 5, at 46, n. 60.  
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Figure 3: Attorneys Ratings of Their State’s Due Process System 
 
When broken down according to attorney type, the responses show that 
school district attorneys and parent attorneys have, on average, very 
different perceptions of the complexity of the due process system. Parent 
attorneys, as a group, perceived the system as more complex than school 
district attorneys. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, which report system ratings 
among parent attorneys and school district attorneys respectively, the 
distribution of responses among parent attorneys is clearly skewed towards 
the right (i.e., more perceived complexity) while the distribution among 
school district attorneys is much more normally distributed. The majority of 
parent attorneys (68%) rated the due process system in their state at a six or 
higher; the majority of school district attorneys (61%) rated the due process 
system in their state at a six or lower. A third of school district attorneys 
rated their state’s due process framework at a five, right in the middle of an 
informal hearing and complex trial. The average score of parent attorneys 
was 6.57, with a median score of 7; the average score of school district 
attorneys was 6.20, with a median score of 6.  
This survey question did not contain an option for comments, so the 
reasons for the perceptions about complexity were not provided by 
respondents. Judging from the comments on other parts of the survey, 
however, the difference in perception could be attributable to the 
requirement that, in most states, parents shoulder the burden of proof but are 
not in possession of the evidence. This makes it far more difficult for parents 
to put together their case. School districts (in most cases) are typically in a 
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defensive position and have easy access to virtually all the evidence, such as 
teacher observations, student work samples, and a full range of professional 
opinions. The challenge for parent attorneys—of having to pull together 
enough evidence to meet a preponderance standard while being limited in 
access to evidence— could well make the case feel more complex for them 
than it does for school attorneys.69 




69 In general, we might also expect that school district attorneys would view the system as less 
complex because, given they represent entire school districts and not individual families, they may see 
many more due process cases than parent attorneys. However, even among school and parent attorneys 
who have each handled more than twenty due process cases, we still see this difference in perception. 
The mean complexity rating among school attorneys who have handled more than twenty due process 
cases is a six; among parent attorneys it is a seven.  
2021] Insights into Due Process Reform 261 
 
     
    




Respondents were also presented with a list of potential barriers that 
might make it difficult for parents to navigate the due process hearing system 
in their state and were asked to indicate which, if any, of those barriers 
characterized their state’s system.70 Figure 6 presents the results, broken 
down across attorney type. First, parent attorneys were much more likely to 
indicate that barriers were present in their state. While seventy-six percent 
of parent attorneys indicated that their state’s due process hearing system 
was too complex for parents to navigate, only thirty-four percent of school 
district attorneys did so. While eighty percent of parent attorneys agreed that 
good results require expensive experts, which most of their parent clients 
cannot afford, only fourteen percent of school district attorneys endorsed 
that view. Similarly, while eighty-two percent of parent attorneys indicated 
 
70 The specific barriers listed were: “Overall hearing system is too complex for most parents to 
navigate; Good results require expensive experts, which most parents can’t afford; Good results require 
representation by attorneys, which most parents can’t afford; Hearing officers do not assist parents in the 
process; Support for parents, from our state’s Parent Training and Information (PTI) Center or other 
organization, is not readily available.” Note that this question is slightly different in format from others 
in the survey. Only those respondents who agreed that one of the listed barriers was in fact a barrier 
responded; those who did not agree were instructed not to respond at all. Thus, the results show the 
number of attorneys who responded, not the percentage.   
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that good results require representation by attorneys, which most parents 
can’t afford, only twenty-seven percent of school district attorneys identified 
that as a barrier. Finally, when it comes to the assistance of hearing officers, 
forty-four percent of parent attorneys reported that hearing officers do not 
assist parents in the process; only five percent of district attorneys did so. 71 
Figure 6: Identifying Barriers to Special Education Due Process 
 
c. Effectiveness 
Participants were next asked whether they thought the due process 
system was an effective way for parents to get special education disputes 
resolved, when represented by an attorney and when not represented by an 
attorney. As noted in Section II, some states allow parents to be represented 
by non-attorney advocates, while other states require that parents either 
proceed pro se or hire legal representation.  
 
 
71 The law does not specifically mandate that hearing officers assist parents; they have discretion 
over what level of assistance is provided. Surely, most inexperienced, pro se parents will have difficulty 
with an administrative hearing and will find the process more accessible with assistance from the hearing 
officer regarding adherence to rules, meaning of terminology, and even presentation of evidence. A 
hearing officer’s obligation to neutrality will limit the extent of assistance that is appropriate, however. 
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Pro Se Parents 
With regard to pro se parents, the majority of respondents reported that 
due process is not an effective system to resolve special education disputes. 
More than half (57%) believe that due process is either never or almost never 
effective. Less than twenty percent think it is effective always (3%) or most 
of the time (13%).  The remainder said it was sometimes effective (26%).  
However, as with the questions concerning complexity and accessibility, 
there are large differences between parent attorneys’ evaluations of the 
effectiveness of due process and those of school district attorneys. 
Attorneys who represent parents, on the whole, do not believe that due 
process can produce favorable results for unrepresented parents.  As 
demonstrated in Figure 7, more than eighty-five percent said that due 
process was never or almost never effective (25% chose never effective; 
61% chose almost never effective) while only twelve percent indicated that 
due process was sometimes effective and only one percent said it was 
effective most of the time. Indeed, one parent attorney commented, “A pro 
se parent has a better chance of winning the Power Ball than winning a due 
process hearing.”  
 




Parent lawyers attributed that absence of success to the parents’ 
general lack of understanding about what is needed to meet their burden of 
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proof, how to present evidence and witnesses, how to respond to motions, 
and how to craft a persuasive argument. Some parent attorneys suggested 
that, because school districts are always represented by lawyers, even when 
the parent is pro se, the playing field is far from even. Other parent lawyers 
reported that hearing officers are far more likely to defer to the school’s 
witnesses when the parent does not have a lawyer to push against that 
deference and are more likely to push a parent toward a less favorable 
settlement. Others commented on the uphill battle parents face because the 
process is rarely concluded within the forty-five-day time limit prescribed in 
the IDEA and pro se parents cannot sustain their case month after month. 
In contrast, school district attorneys were considerably more positive 
regarding pro se parents’ chances of prevailing in due process. In the view 
of more than eighty percent of the school district lawyers in the sample, due 
process is at least sometimes effective for pro se parents (sometimes: 44%; 
most of the time: 30%; and always: 7%).72 Several school district lawyers 
commented that they thought parents could sometimes do better 
unrepresented than represented. They suggested that the hearing officers 
“bend over backwards” to explain the process to the parents and that they 
themselves try to get to a resolution early in the process before a hearing 
occurs. Without the impact of attorney fee negotiations, they said, the 
discussions can focus more directly on the student’s needs. In their view, a 
settlement is more often reached through mediation or at the resolution 
session when the parents are not represented. Nevertheless, a number of 
school district lawyers did note that unrepresented parents are typically ill-
equipped to handle the complexities of a due process hearing or present 
effective arguments. One school district lawyer shared that over a long 
career, she had never lost a case to an unrepresented parent but had settled 
several. 
One notable area of agreement between the two groups of lawyers is on 
alternatives to due process: attorneys on both sides suggested that pro se 
parents were more likely to be successful using the state complaint process 
or mediation. They noted that the state complaint process is much more 
accessible to parents and that parents are more likely to get the relief they 
seek.73 At least one parent lawyer said, however, that even that process was 
not always accessible. This is because school districts had begun using due 
process to appeal state complaint decisions favorable to parents, thus 
 
72 The comments suggested that a few lawyers read the question as comparing representation by 
attorneys with representation by non-attorney advocates, as opposed to asking about parents with no 
representation at all. 
73 This position is understandable, as the burden on the parents is considerably lower in the state 
complaint process. In that process, the parent need only present a complaint to the state educational 
agency; the state agency then gathers the evidence, investigates the complaint, and makes a decision. 
Once the parent has presented the complaint, there is no ongoing role for the parent, other than to answer 
questions of the state investigator should the investigator have any.   
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requiring parents to navigate due process anyway.  
 
Represented Parents 
On the question of whether due process is effective at resolving special 
education disputes when the parent is represented by an attorney, the 
differences of opinion between school district lawyers and parent lawyers 
were not as pronounced as on other questions. School district lawyers were 
more likely to say that the process was effective “most of the time” than 
were parent lawyers (49% of school district lawyers vs. 33% of parent 
lawyers); parent lawyers were more likely to say that the process was just 
“sometimes” effective for parents (51% of parent lawyers vs. 32% of school 
district lawyers). While the differences in opinion were less marked than 
with respect to pro se parents, the differences are still quite significant. The 
specific breakdowns across attorney type are presented in Figure 8. 
Parent attorneys generally reported that having an attorney improves the 
chances of a parent getting the dispute resolved. Some commented that 
representation helps level the playing field because school districts are 
always represented; it also helps families enter good settlements. Another 
said that in his experience, the majority of cases are settled before a hearing 
when there are attorneys on both sides.  
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A prevalent viewpoint of school district lawyers, however, is that the 
issue of parent attorney fees impairs the effectiveness of due process. 
“Attorneys’ fees drive the train,” commented one school board lawyer. 
Another said, “Some parent attorneys are VERY unreasonable when it 
comes to fees, which holds up the whole system of trying to resolve disputes 
in the best interest of the student and his/her FAPE.” Yet another shared this 
experience: “The [parent’s attorney’s] strategy seems to be to run up the time 
and bills for the school districts…Our small-sized districts are forced to 
settle and pay $15,000 or more to the attorney in order to get the settlement 
because they would literally go broke paying for the due process hearing.” 
With somewhat more recognition of the need for parent attorneys to get paid 
for their work, another remarked, “Winning at due process is the only way 
that a parent’s attorney can access the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, so 
parents who are represented by counsel almost always end up going through 
due process.” 
Perhaps not surprisingly, parent attorneys also mention the issues of 
fees, but with a different emphasis. Many parent attorneys bemoan the 
expense of prosecuting a due process case for a parent, noting how few 
parents can afford counsel. One remarked, “The original purpose of a timely, 
cost-effective hearing has been turned on its ear. At present, getting a case 
through a hearing costs approximately $50,000 to $100,000 of qualified 
attorney time. This is due to the legal complexities districts’ counsel create 
and financially benefit from.” Another said, “It is too expensive to be useful 
for anything other than private placement cases.”  Several parent lawyers see 
the school districts as the power players. One described it this way: “Special 
education attorneys come from small offices and represent clients that 
typically cannot afford attorneys. The school districts have big, big resources 
and teams of attorneys and paralegals, so it is a David and Goliath situation.”  
Both school district attorneys and parent attorneys acknowledged that 
the effectiveness of due process is highly dependent on the lawyers. School 
district lawyers frequently noted that the process can be ineffective when the 
parent’s lawyer is not experienced or knowledgeable about special education 
law, while parent lawyers commented that the chance of resolution depended 
on whether or not school district’s law firm was overly litigious. Others 
noted that the skills that attorneys bring to the table facilitate resolution of 
the case. One school district attorney noted that attorneys tend to work 
toward resolving matters in most cases, regardless of which side they are 
representing. That attorney remarked, “Attorneys are trained to present 
evidence and make arguments in a concise and orderly manner that usually 
saves time and expenses. Attorneys rarely incite their clients’ emotions and 
can be useful in calming difficult personalities. That is true for both parent 
attorneys and school division attorneys.”  
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C. Attorney Attitudes Towards Specific Aspects of Due Process 
In addition to asking respondents about their general perceptions of the 
complexity, accessibility, and effectiveness of due process, the survey also 
asked respondents to report more specifically on the use of formal discovery 
and expert witnesses. These topics were chosen on the theory that they were 
the most likely to add complexity to the process, especially for parents.  
Discovery 
States differ on whether formal discovery is allowed as part of due 
process procedures.74 Respondents were asked to indicate the formal 
discovery tools, if any, that they usually use in due process cases. A little 
more than half the attorneys indicated they used discovery; the rest did not. 
Among the attorneys who use discovery, as shown in Figure 9, requests for 
the production of documents were the most common form of discovery, with 
requests for admissions, written interrogatories, and depositions used far less 
frequently. Slightly more than half reported using requests for production of 
documents when preparing for a due process case, while less than twenty 
percent reported using written interrogatories, depositions, or requests for 
admission. These patterns were repeated, with slight variation, when the data 
were grouped by parent attorneys and school district attorneys. Among 
school district attorneys, fifty percent use requests for documents, twenty-
two percent use written interrogatories, sixteen percent use depositions, and 
twelve percent use requests for admission. Among parent attorneys, fifty-six 
percent use requests for production of documents, seventeen percent use 
written interrogatories, twelve percent use depositions, and sixteen percent 
use requests for admission. 
 
 
74 The IDEA is silent on the use of discovery in due process. A 1996 letter from the federal Office 
of Special Education Programs within the U.S. Department of Education contained the following 
response to a question asking whether it was permissible under the IDEA for a school district to request 
that a parent answer interrogatories or produce documents prior to the hearing: “Part B does not contain 
discovery rules, and there is nothing in Part B that would prohibit or require use of discovery proceedings 
such as those described in your inquiry. Whether discovery is used in a Part B due process hearing and 
the nature and extent of discovery methods used are matters left to the discretion of the hearing officer 
and could be subject to any relevant State or local rules or procedures.” Letter from OSEP, to Stadler 
(Jul. 5, 1996). On file with authors. 
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Figure 9: Use of Discovery Tools 
 
Eighty-six attorneys provided comments on the use of formal discovery 
in due process hearings; both school district attorneys and parent attorneys 
had a considerable amount to say. Most of the comments fell into one of four 
major categories: pro-discovery comments, anti-discovery comments, 
comments focused on the costs of discovery, and comments focused on the 
improper use of discovery by the opposing side. Comments in favor or 
against formal discovery begin the following discussion, followed by those 
suggesting that discovery is either too costly or used improperly.  
Should Formal Discovery Be Allowed? 
Of the thirty-four school district attorneys who provided comments on 
the use of formal discovery, more were opposed to its use than were in favor 
of it. While eleven attorneys detailed why they felt formal discovery is an 
impediment to the due process system, only five attorneys advocated for 
greater discovery. Of those five, only two provided a detailed explanation as 
to why formal discovery would be useful. One attorney noted that “access 
to private medical/psychological/education providers is often critical to due 
process claims, but without the ability to get it, the school district doesn’t 
have what it needs to assess settlement options or prepare for a hearing.” An 
attorney who does not have access to discovery remarked, “discovery and 
motion practice would allow hearing officers to focus the issues that should 
be addressed during due process hearings. Often, hearings turn into multi-
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day and multi-week free-for-alls. Adequate discovery and motion practice 
could assist in this regard.” 
Those school district lawyers who opposed the use of formal discovery 
cited a number of reasons for their opposition. One repeated justification for 
restricting discovery was time, or the lack thereof. It was noted that the tight 
deadlines for each step of the due process framework “don’t lend themselves 
well to the timelines for written discovery.” Others said allowing formal 
discovery would “slow down the case” and take “time away” from more 
important aspects of the case. Numerous school district attorneys also 
suggested that allowing for formal discovery would lead to a more arduous 
due process system. Adding formal discovery would be “too broad [and] 
burdensome,” one said. Multiple attorneys noted that, due to the size of 
student files, document production could “end up being thousands of pages.” 
Parent attorney views were more divided about whether formal 
discovery aids or impedes the due process system. Of those offering 
comments on discovery, eleven indicated opposition to allowing the use of 
formal discovery, while ten suggested that formal discovery should be 
allowed.75 Those respondents who felt formal discovery should be allowed 
said that formal discovery is “essential…for the side that bears the burden 
of proof,” and that it “help[s] level the playing field for parents.” Parent 
attorneys who opposed the use of formal discovery, like their school district 
counterparts, frequently mentioned the time constraints of due process. 
These respondents said formal discovery would “complicate and slow down 
the otherwise fairly efficient process and shortened timeline,” and would 
“delay[] a decision beyond the applicable time frame.” Formal discovery 
was also viewed as making what should be an informal process too formal 
and complicated. One attorney noted that “[o]n the whole, I think it’s 
preferable for the hearing process to be more informal in order to level the 
playing field between parents and districts.” Another noted that “formal 
discovery is intimidating to pro se parents and makes the process more 
formal and more akin to typical litigation.”  
The Costs of Discovery & Improper Use 
Both school district lawyers (6) and parent lawyers (11) expressed 
concerns about the costs that formal discovery imposes. While school 
district attorneys’ comments were characterized by a simple recognition that 
discovery adds costs, however, the comments provided by parent attorneys 
also reflected a concern that increased costs would have particular impact 
on lower-income families. Formal discovery, it was feared, would “price 
parents out of getting their hearing,” and “have the effect of hindering, if not 
 
75 The remaining comments by parent attorneys were best categorized as neutral, neither 
advocating for nor opposing the use of formal discovery in due process.  
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barring, parents (especially low-income parents) from utilizing the due 
process system.”  
As might be expected in this adversarial setting, attorneys on both sides 
suggested that the other sides’ attorneys used discovery as a weapon.  One 
school district attorney suggested that “[p]arents’ attorneys…will file formal 
discovery very early, even when it’s clear the case will settle quickly, in an 
effort to drive up costs and pressure the school.” Other school district 
lawyers suggested that discovery was used by parent attorneys for 
“nuisance/harassment purposes” and to “mire school districts down in 
responding to requests rather than preparing for a hearing.”  
Parent attorneys showed a similar frustration and sense of discovery 
“weaponization.”  One lawyer representing parents noted that the school 
districts “use discovery to significantly increase the legal expenses for 
families in the hope they will run out of money and give up.” Another parent 
attorney suggested that the school districts “throw[] in the kitchen sink, thus 
making it impossible to prepare.” Like the school district attorneys, parent 
attorneys indicated frustration with what were viewed as purposely 
burdensome discovery practices: “Here, school district attorneys employ the 
practice of sending multiple copies of the same documents in discovery such 
that you might end up with 35 copies of the same exact document. This 
results in productions that range from 5,000 to 15,000 pages of produced 
documents that must be slogged through which waste the family’s time and 
resources.” 
The considerable variation in attitudes toward discovery reveal that its 
usefulness in due process hearings continues to be a matter of significant 
debate. While discovery can enhance the parties’ opportunity to obtain 
information not contained in the student’s official records, it can also add 
cost and complexity to the proceeding. Not surprisingly, many attorneys 
view their own discovery practices as necessary and reasonable, but the 
opposing side’s use to be unnecessary and unreasonable. Consensus on the 
issue is illusive. 
Expert Witnesses 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether, in their experience, 
evidence from an expert witness is typically necessary to obtain a favorable 
ruling on a substantive issue in a due process case. One hundred and fifty-
nine lawyers responded to this question, with three-quarters agreeing that 
evidence from an expert witness is necessary to secure a favorable ruling. 
When the data are broken down across attorney type, views diverge. As 
shown in Figure 9, parent attorneys are considerably more likely than school 
district attorneys to report that an expert witness is necessary to obtain a 
favorable ruling. While ninety-three percent of the parent attorneys indicated 
that an expert witness is necessary, school district attorneys were much more 
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divided on the issue: forty-eight percent reported that an expert witness was 
not necessary to obtain a favorable ruling, while fifty-two percent agreed it 
was. 
Figure 10: Need for Expert Witnesses 
 
Eighty-one attorneys offered comments on the use of expert witnesses 
in special education due process hearings, and both school district attorneys 
(30) and parent attorneys (51) had strong opinions on the subject. The 
comments were sorted into four groups: comments focused on parents’ 
inability to meet their burden of proof without an expert witness, comments 
concerning the high cost of expert witnesses, comments highlighting school 
districts’ ability to use staff as “built-in” experts, and comments regarding 
the use of unqualified experts. Comments of those who see expert witnesses 
as necessary but prohibitively costly for parents begin the discussion, 
followed by those suggesting that school districts gain advantage by having 
built-in experts or presenting unqualified experts. 
Expert Witnesses Necessary for Parents but also Costly 
Nearly half (24) of the parent attorneys who provided comments on the 
use of expert witnesses focused on the inability of parents to succeed without 
providing expert testimony. For parents to “have any chance in prevailing,” 
these attorneys suggested, it is critical for parents to retain an expert witness. 
Indeed, one attorney reported that “[e]xpert witnesses are essential to 
winning even the simplest cases,” while another noted that “one cannot even 
think of prevailing without an expert witness [and as such] I will not take a 
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case if the parents are unwilling to pay an expert to testify and appear.” 
A number of parent attorneys pointed out that school districts come with 
“built-in” experts, i.e., their school staff, and so it is necessary for parents to 
bring their own experts to “combat” school officials. Others noted that 
expert witnesses are critical in “educating” the judge or hearing officer as to 
the child’s special education needs. Many parent attorneys suggested that 
school staff are often given deference by the judge or hearing officer, and 
thus it is “necessary [for parents] to have witnesses who can speak with 
authority and experience…about various aspects of students’ diagnoses and 
resulting needs.” 
At the same time parent attorneys highlighted the necessity of retaining 
an expert witness, they also expressed considerable frustration regarding the 
high costs of doing so. The costs of retaining expert witnesses were 
consistently seen as a powerful barrier to indigent and low-income families. 
Because these costs cannot be shifted to the school district, parents must pay 
for their experts even when they ultimately prevail in the case. As one parent 
attorney commented, “The problem with experts is the cost. Not being able 
to recoup the cost of an expert— even when the prevailing party— is a huge 
impediment to parents’ ability to afford going to due process.” 
Although school district attorneys also focused on the costs of expert 
witnesses in their comments, their focus centered less on the particular 
burdens of expert witnesses and more on the overall expense of the hearing. 
One school district attorney noted that “many cases become ‘battles of the 
experts’ and run up insane costs.” Another seemed to doubt the motivations 
of parents’ witnesses, suggesting that parents’ expert witnesses “often seem 
to be pushing an agenda, including advocating that the LEA should be 
paying for their services.” 
Built-In Experts & Unqualified Experts 
Both school district attorneys’ and parent attorneys’ comments reflected 
an awareness that school district staff can, and often do, serve as expert 
witnesses in due process hearings. Seven school district attorneys who 
mentioned this occurrence acknowledged it in a matter-of-fact way, 
exemplified by this remark: “I find that school the school district’s internal 
staff serve as expert witnesses very effectively for my clients; I usually don’t 
need an “outside” expert. My client’s employees are experts in their areas.” 
On the other hand, parent attorneys view school districts’ ability to put forth 
“built-in” experts as placing parents at a distinct disadvantage. One attorney 
noted that while parents have access to their child’s independent evaluations, 
they still “have to pay for experts to testify…or find ones that are willing to 
testify for free.” Indeed, one attorney asserted that “[t]he only party that is 
not harmed by the requirement of expert testimony is the school district, 
because it has educational experts on hand it can call on with ease.” 
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Additionally, several parent attorneys suggested that school “experts” 
are often given greater deference by hearing officers. It was noted that 
“[c]linician input is always vital to the presentation of our cases” because 
“[s]chool districts are given the benefit of the doubt most often by hearing 
officers— they are seen as the educational experts. It’s often necessary to 
have witnesses who can speak with authority and experience, often more so 
than the district’s witnesses…” Others suggested that hearing officers often 
give school district experts the “benefit of the doubt” or “deference over the 
parents’ retained expert” because the school’s witnesses “can pretty much 
observe the student at school whenever they want, while that takes more 
coordination and possibly expense on the parent/student side.” 
A few school district attorneys’ comments, however, suggested that they 
felt that it was parents’ experts that are given greater (and undue) deference. 
One suggested that “too much weight is often given to [outside experts] 
because they are in private practice and thought to be more skilled than 
public school experts.” Others suggested that “hearing officers often defer 
to [parents’] expert witnesses even when they know little about education” 
and that parents’ experts are “[g]iven too much deference when they have 
relatively limited exposure to the student and their areas of expertise are 
often tangential to educators.” Indeed, one school district attorney suggested 
that expert witnesses almost always help parents, “even when the expert has 
limited practical knowledge and is obviously biased due to relationships 
with the parent or student.”  
Attorneys on both sides expressed doubt and suspicion as to the 
qualifications of the opposing sides’ experts, but in very distinct ways. 
Among school district lawyers, it was noted that parents’ experts often have 
“no direct knowledge of the particular student at issue,” and “are rarely 
experienced in education law or the requirements of special education” and 
come from areas of expertise that “are often tangential to education.” Parent 
attorneys, however, did not seem to view experience in an educational 
setting as necessarily dispositive of quality. In particular, parent attorneys 
expressed frustration with school districts routinely using their staff as 
experts, when under usual expert rules, they would not qualify.  One attorney 
noted that even first-year teachers are often considered experts. 
On the whole, the majority of those attorneys who chose to comment on 
the use of expert witness, both parent attorneys and school district attorneys, 
expressed frustration with the use of expert witnesses. The reasons for such 
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IV. ATTORNEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
 
At the end of the survey, participants were asked an open-ended 
question:  If you were to suggest changes to the due process hearing system 
in your state, what might those be? Nearly one-hundred respondents left 
comments, (thirty-nine school district lawyers and fifty-seven parent 
lawyers, which accounts for a bit more than half of each group of 
respondents) revealing the high interest in reforming due process. The range 
of the comments reflected not only many differing views, but also the variety 
of characteristics of the due process system throughout the country. For 
example, where there is no discovery allowed, some lawyers want it and 
others are glad it is not available; where discovery is allowed, some want to 
get rid of it and some prefer to keep it. Similarly, where the rules of evidence 
and civil procedure are used, a number of lawyers want to eliminate or 
loosen them, yet where they are not in place, lawyers wish for them.  
Nevertheless, a few strong themes percolated throughout the comments. 
For example, both school district and parent lawyers expressed the need for 
better trained hearing officers. Indeed, there was more agreement on this 
point than any other. Quite a few comments referred to hearing officers’ lack 
of understanding of special education law; others mentioned a lack of skill 
in applying the law to the facts or in basic procedures. One lawyer thought 
that hearing officers should have to pass a competency test before hearing 
due process cases; others preferred hearing officers who only handle special 
education cases, which would give them sufficient opportunity to develop 
expertise. 
The lack of a sufficient number of hearing officers to handle the caseload 
was raised by lawyers from a number of different states (Illinois, New 
Jersey, Kentucky, New York). Mirroring the comments made about the 
effectiveness of due process in resolving parent disputes, parent attorneys 
frequently noted that hearing officers are not impartial and have a strong bias 
toward school districts. Some attributed this to the appointment process or 
the payment system. 
Finding ways to reduce the complexity of hearings was another very 
common theme among the comments, and again one shared by attorneys 
representing both sides. Some comments were quite general, such as, 
“simplify the procedures” or “make any reasonable change that reduces the 
cost.” Others were more specific, such as, “allow for subpoenas for records 
of third parties without need for hearing officer signature.” One school board 
lawyer suggested that the process should be essentially on paper, with cases 
being resolved by a summary judgment type process in which both parties 
would submit documentary evidence, affidavits, and written arguments, 
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supplemented by an hour for each side to make an oral argument.76 
Simplifying discovery would also be a welcome change according to 
several respondents. One respondent suggested that discovery be limited to 
requests for production of documents; another thought there should be rules 
for mandatory disclosures instead of discovery. Another proposal was for 
more clarity about the applicable rules. One attorney commented, “Too 
much is left to the discretion of hearing officers, even with regard to how 
they will accept communication and documents,…timing of prehearing 
calls, and how and when they will sign subpoenas.” The need for clarity and 
certainty of rules was also expressed this way: “Procedures need to be 
adopted and formalized so that each hearing isn’t like the wild, wild west.”  
Quite a number of respondents focused on the length of hearings, with 
the majority suggesting that hearings be limited to either two, three, or five 
days. Several described hearings of ten to twenty days, remarking that 
hearing officers do not do enough to require the parties to streamline their 
evidence and engage in efficient time management. Allowing hearings to be 
scheduled over multiple months on non-consecutive days was viewed as 
problematic, as the judges cannot remember the testimony taken months 
before and the child’s needs change over the course of an extended hearing. 
More timely decisions are needed, according to several respondents; they 
noted that the forty-five-day requirement in IDEA is routinely ignored. Two 
respondents, however, one who represents schools and another parents, 
suggested that the timelines are too short, predicting that resolution would 
be easier to reach with more time. 
A number of respondents mentioned preventing the need for due process 
hearings.  Mandatory mediation was a frequent suggestion, particularly from 
school district lawyers, as a preferable way to reach an early resolution. A 
parent lawyer who approves of mediation thought it was preferable to due 
process because of the retaliation experienced by parents who choose to use 
the due process system. Another parent attorney thought mandatory 
mediation could be helpful as long as the mediator was not thereafter the 
hearing officer on the case. 
Many parent attorneys, but no school board attorneys, said that to 
improve the whole process, parents must be able to recover the cost of expert 
witnesses. In line with their answers to the more specific question about 
expert witnesses, parent attorneys see a clear need for either reimbursement 
for the cost of experts or the development of a funding source to pay for 
experts. A few respondents thought the appointment of independent experts 
by the hearing officer would improve the fairness of the system. One school 
board lawyer proposed prohibiting the use of expert witnesses. 
Related to the cost of experts is the cost of attorneys themselves. Many 
 
76 This suggestion would require a change to the IDEA itself, which gives to parties the right in 
due process to present and cross-examine witnesses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (2018). 
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participants suggested that reforms are needed to address the high cost of 
attorneys and the inability of most parents to meet that cost. Three school 
board lawyers and nearly twenty parent lawyers suggested that parents need 
more options for obtaining affordable representation. Recommendations 
included an increase in training for pro bono lawyers, an appointment 
system, more law school clinics specializing in education cases, greater 
priority for these cases at legal aid offices, and a state fund for payment of 
lawyers for parents. Three respondents, one school board lawyer and two 
parent lawyers, suggested that a certification process for non-attorney 
advocates could produce adequately trained people to represent parents at a 
lower fee. 
Several school district attorneys, perhaps not unpredictably, favor a 
change that would alter the IDEA’s fee-shifting provisions that require 
school districts to pay fees of prevailing parents.  One school lawyer 
described the problem this way: “Some parent attorneys are VERY 
(emphasis in original) unreasonable when it comes to fees which holds up 
the whole system of trying to resolve disputes in the best interest of the 
student and his/her FAPE.” Another view expressed was that the threat of 
paying exorbitant fees “is what drives 95% of settlements” causing school 
districts to “give in.” Apparently because some districts will not pay attorney 
fees unless due process is pending, a school district lawyer lamented as 
follows: “It is not uncommon for parents to reach a practical resolution 
outside of a hearing, through an IEP meeting or other means, but then be 
forced to go to hearing so that the parent attorneys can seek fees from the 
district.” A parent attorney proposed capping fees and costs for both parties, 
which would create an incentive to resolve cases “without all-out war.”  
A view expressed frequently by parent attorneys was that school districts 
should have the burden of proof. One elaborated on that idea, saying, 
“School districts should have the burden of proof until or unless 85% of the 
students with disabilities are graduating with a standard diploma with their 
original cohorts.” A school district lawyer from New York, where the district 
has the burden of proof under state law, thought the burden should be on the 
parents instead. Having the burden on the school district, said the lawyer, 
“encourages frivolous litigation by parents and unnecessarily increases costs 
for school districts.” 
A broad suggestion made equally by parent and school board lawyers 
was to revamp the system entirely, though no one had a blueprint for doing 
so. “There has to be a way to accomplish the goals of IDEA that is more 
efficient and cost effective for the district and the parent,” remarked one 
school board lawyer. Another questioned whether the current system reflects 
the true intent of the regulations. Similarly, a parent lawyer said, “A stronger 
and faster alternative to due process hearings would be the better solution.” 
In a realistic vein, a parent lawyer observed, “There are no short-term or 
quick fixes for an adjudicative system that has been in place since 1977.”  
2021] Insights into Due Process Reform 277 
 
     
    
A. Analysis and Recommendations 
Finding the sweet spot for due process hearings is a Goldilocks problem: 
they should not be so complex and expensive that parents cannot access 
them but cannot be so stripped down that they do not give parents a realistic 
opportunity to challenge a school district’s decision regarding their child’s 
education.77 At the same time, because school districts must serve many 
children, and with limited resources, the due process system should be 
structured so as to quickly weed out frivolous complaints and keep it 
manageable for the districts as well. Creating a due process hearing system 
that is “just right” has been a significant challenge. 
Any reform proposals must confront the reality that much of the 
unwelcome complexity and expense comes with the territory. The subject 
matter of due process hearings is inherently complicated. Sophisticated 
expertise is needed to understand the nature of the child’s disabilities, how 
those conditions impair learning, what rate and level of educational progress 
is reasonable, and what interventions are needed to address the impact of the 
child’s challenges. Even very knowledgeable professionals struggle to 
precisely diagnose and understand the unique combination of impairments 
affecting any particular child and to accurately assess the impact of potential 
programming and placement choices.  
At the same time, the legal standards are strikingly vague. Concepts such 
as an “appropriate education,”78 “reasonably calculated,”79 and “in light of 
the child’s circumstances”80 leave considerable room for disagreement. 
While the vagueness is perhaps necessary in light of the uniqueness of each 
individual child, it nevertheless opens the door to differing viewpoints. Even 
parents who accept the limitations on IEPs— i.e., that they need not be 
designed to maximize their child’s potential81—may still perceive that their 
child’s progress is insufficient while the child’s teacher sees it as reasonable.  
The procedures required by the IDEA likewise contribute to complexity. 
To assure meaningful procedural protections, the IDEA requires a detailed 
written complaint and an evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer with 
 
77 For example, rules that prohibit experts, require evidence to be presented in a very limited 
amount of time, or limit the role of attorneys could make for an efficient hearing, but one in which the 
parents would be quite unlikely to be able to meet their burden of proof. 
78 The basic promise of the IDEA is that each child is entitled to a “free appropriate public 
education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2016). 
79 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982) (holding that the IEP must be reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive an education benefit). 
80 Endrew v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (ruling that the 
appropriateness of a child’s IEP should be judged in light of the child’s circumstances). 
81 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176 (1982) (rejecting the argument that a child with a disability is 
entitled to an education that will maximize the child’s potential). 
278 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20.2 
 
 
cross-examination.82 Such features alone require a high level of literacy and 
understanding of the law, which puts the process beyond the capacity of 
most parents and school district personnel. As a result, both sides need legal 
representation. So long as attorneys must be involved—especially attorneys 
with the requisite expertise, and for parent lawyers, the willingness to take 
on the risks of a contingency agreement —they must be appropriately 
compensated. At the same time, with the complexity of the subject matter of 
most special education disputes, the testimony of expert witnesses is nearly 
always needed. Experts, too, need to be compensated for their participation. 
Thus, significant expense is inevitable.  
Finally, reform proposals have a higher likelihood of success if there is 
buy-in from both parents and schools. But as was borne out in the responses 
to this survey, the targets for reform are highly influenced by one’s 
viewpoint. The special education lawyers who answered our nationwide 
survey clearly identified with their clients’ positions; their perceptions of the 
flaws in the system seemingly followed directly from their allegiances.83 For 
example, lawyers who represent school districts view the process as less 
complex than do parent lawyers, although both are participating in the very 
same process.84 Likewise, lawyers who represent school districts are much 
more likely to view the current due process hearing as an effective tool for 
resolution of disputes than are parent lawyers, though they too find much 
fault with the system as it is. The comments made by the two groups not 
only revealed their differing opinions, but in some cases, very negative 
feelings about the opposing attorneys, calling them “very unreasonable,” or 
accusing them of “weaponizing” discovery tools. While certainly not 
universal, this negativity toward the other side may be a factor in the lack of 
consensus on how to repair what many consider a broken system of dispute 
resolution. 
Even within groups, there were many differing views. For example, on 
the question asking attorneys to rate the complexity of the hearings in their 
state on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most complex, attorneys on 
the same side, in the same state, provided starkly divergent responses. For 
example, the ratings of complexity by the nine parent attorneys from New 
Jersey ranged from two through ten. It is difficult to know whether these 
contradictory ratings reveal true differences (perhaps related to different 
practices among hearing officers within the same state) or something else 
 
82 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2018). 
83 Differing perceptions of the two groups of lawyers is not entirely unexpected. Parent and school 
district lawyers are, after all, adversaries in the process, with opposing positions in every case. Most cases 
that reach the stage of due process have already been through multiple efforts at dispute resolution: 
discussions at IEP meetings, mediation, a resolution session, and settlement talks. By the time the case 
is at due process, the parties have dug in their heels and may well view the opposing side as being 
unreasonably recalcitrant. 
84 See supra note 63. 
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affecting perceptions. In the New Jersey case, the two attorneys at the 
extremes were both highly experienced attorneys, so each had a good 
vantage point from which to judge. Again, with such conflicting 
observations about what is happening, agreement about how to address due 
process may continue to prove elusive. 
Despite the variety of views, certain ideas surfaced frequently enough to 
suggest areas for potential reform in the due process system. Each of these 
appears to have some support from both groups of practicing lawyers, 
suggesting their clients would favor them as well. They are largely neutral, 
offering benefits to all involved. They are within the authority of the state 
educational agencies, thus not requiring Congressional action. The strongest 
themes are as discussed below.  
1. Well-Trained, Objective Hearing Officers 
From the point of view of special education lawyers across the board, 
hearing officers with both case management skills and substantive 
knowledge of special education is vitally important.  Everyone benefits 
when the hearing is well-run, and the hearing officer fairly and correctly 
applies the law to the facts, without an initial predisposition toward either 
side. States should examine their qualifications for hearing officers, their 
hiring processes, their initial and ongoing training requirements, and their 
payment system (together with the potential for unintended biases related to 
the payment system) to assure that they are employing hearing officers with 
the requisite skills and commitment to manage and decide the cases 
effectively. 
The trend toward using administrative law judges (ALJs) in a state’s 
administrative court85 has the advantage of allowing the state education 
department to rely on the processes already in place for the resolution of 
administrative disputes. Administrative law judges tend to be lawyers86 who 
are familiar with civil procedure and evidentiary standards and are likely to 
be better equipped than non-lawyers to manage the case in a professional 
manner. Administrative courts have a body of rules that can be adapted for 
use in due process, relieving the state educational agencies of having to 
develop their own rules.  Judging from some of the comments regarding the 
process where the hearing officers are not ALJs, the lack of standard rules 
and enormous discretion given to the hearing officers is destabilizing to the 
entire process.87 Nevertheless, to the extent that state administrative courts 
 
85 Connolly, Zirkel & Mayes, supra note 29, at 158 (2019). 
86 Id. at 159. 
87 Consider these comments from respondents: “Hearing Officers in DC have a lot of discretion to 
allow/order something, however there is no right to formal discovery.” “In Utah we do not have a formal 
set of rules which offer guidance to hearing officers on how to conduct their role. At times I have been 
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are themselves highly “judicialized,” using these courts for special education 
hearings may cut against the goal of increased procedural simplicity. 
Another potential disadvantage of using the ALJs in the state 
administrative court is lack of specialized knowledge in special education.  
If the ALJs are randomly assigned and hear only a few special education 
cases, they have little opportunity to develop the expertise needed to 
understand the intricacies of the special education system as well as the 
nature of children’s disabilities and their impact on education. When ALJs 
are less well-versed in the subject matter, there is more need for experts and 
extended testimony, adding to the overall expense and length of hearings. 
This disadvantage can be mitigated by identifying certain ALJs who will be 
regularly assigned special education cases.   
Regardless of whether states use ALJs or independent hearing officers, 
they need a system to monitor the hearing officers for quality control.  One 
survey respondent commented that when a hearing officer’s decision is 
reversed by a reviewing court, there is no mechanism for the hearing officer 
to learn of the reversal so as to learn from the review. Hearing officers whose 
decisions are consistently reversed should likely lose their contract for the 
role. Mandatory training for all hearing officers should be in place in every 
state. 
2. Clarity and Comprehensiveness of Rules 
All parties to due process welcome clarity regarding the rules that will 
govern the hearing, from the pre-hearing stage through the appeal stage. 
Currently, the level of detail in the rules regarding due process hearings 
varies considerably from state to state. When the rules are sparse, hearing 
officers have discretion to fill in the gaps. This leaves parties not knowing 
what to expect, which can be especially problematic for less experienced 
lawyers or advocates and unrepresented parents.  
As broad support exists for clear and comprehensive rules, all states 
should review their rules and determine if they sufficiently give parties the 
information they need to know about procedures as they approach due 
process. States should make sure the rules are easily accessible on the state’s 
website and written in a straightforward way. Timelines, the right to 
discovery, evidentiary rules, expert qualification, subpoena procedures, and 
the like should not be left to the discretion of hearing officers. These matters 
should be explicitly covered in the rules, allowing for uniformity across the 
state. 
 
told that we would follow the federal rules of evidence and at others that we would use an undetermined 
"relaxed version of the rules of evidence.” “We have had a highly trained independent hearing officer for 
the past 15-20 years who does a fabulous job and knows the laws and rules very well. If he retires, I don't 
know that we will maintain the same quality and fairness.” 
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3. Reduction of Costs 
Lawyers on both sides of due process cases are concerned about the 
increasing cost of the cases. High costs prevent many parents with legitimate 
claims from pursuing them and put a burden on school districts that could 
be spending that money on educating children. The two largest contributors 
to high cost are attorney fees and expert witness fees. Potential approaches 
to reducing the high cost of due process are presented below. 
a. Attorney Fees 
Assuming the parent is represented, both sides in a case must cover 
attorney fees. The mechanisms by which the fees are paid differ, however. 
School districts will always have to cover the fees of their lawyers. This 
might be done through in-house counsel, which would typically be more cost 
effective, or with outside attorneys. Insurance may assist with outside 
counsel in some cases.88  
Parents may or may not have to cover their attorney’s fees, depending 
on the agreement with their attorney and the success of the case. IDEA 
contains a fee-shifting provision, requiring that the school district pay the 
parent’s attorney fees if the parent is the prevailing party in the due process 
case.89 Thus, many parent attorneys in private practice take cases on 
contingency, expecting to get their fees paid by the school district either in 
a favorable settlement or after a favorable hearing decision.90 Parents 
typically pay a retainer fee, which is usually not returned if the case is 
unsuccessful. Some non-profit organizations and law school clinics provide 
free counsel to parents, either with or without income-eligibility 
guidelines.91 Even when parents are not required to pay their lawyers 
 
88 For a general discussion of school district insurance coverage, see Marcos Antonio Mendoza, 
The Limits of Insurance as Governance: Professional Liability Coverage for Civil Rights Claims Against 
Public School Districts, 38 QUIN. L. R. 375 (2020). 
89 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2004). 
90 Parent attorneys must either obtain the fees through settlement, or by seeking them in federal 
district court following the due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2004). The court has 
discretion to award reasonable fees as part of the costs when the prevailing part is the parent of a child 
with a disability, but is required to reduce the fees requested upon a finding that they are unreasonable 
or excessive, the parent or attorney unreasonably protracted the resolution of the controversy or failed to 
give the school district proper notice. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F) (2004). The fee reduction does not apply, 
however, if the school district unreasonably protracted the final resolution. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) 
(2004). For an example of a fee reduction for the parent’s attorney, see J.L. v. Harrison Township Bd. of 
Educ., No. 14-2666, 2016 WL 4430929, at *17-18 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2016).     
91 Legal aid organizations nationwide funded in part by the Legal Services Corporation limit 
eligibility to those families with an income of less than 125% of the federal poverty guidelines. 45 C.F.R. 
§1611.3(b) (1977). State protection and advocacy organizations, on the other hand, do not have income 
guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(C) (2006). Policies with regard to income eligibility at law school 
clinics vary according to local policy and state student practice acts. For example, in North Carolina, law 
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directly, they may be asked to allow the legal organization to pursue attorney 
fees as a way to support the organization. Thus, the school district may still 
be responsible for parent fees in a settlement or in cases in which the parent 
prevails even when the attorney is with a non-profit.   
More availability of free counsel for parents would go a long way toward 
reducing the overall expense of due process. It is easier for non-profit 
attorneys to waive their fees, especially during settlement; this can bring 
down the total costs of due process and ease the burden on the districts of 
having to pay for both sides’ fees.92 Furthermore, non-profit attorneys 
representing parents often work to resolve disputes at the IEP level or 
through pre-due process settlement without the pressure of needing to 
recover fees, significantly reducing the overall expense of a dispute. 
Nevertheless, reducing the risk to districts of having to pay parents’ attorney 
fees could simultaneously reduce the pressure that risk places on the districts 
to assiduously adhere to the IDEA’s prescriptions. Thus, while more access 
to free or low-cost counsel to parents in need could improve accessibility 
and potentially bring overall costs down, the fee-shifting provision remains 
an important enforcement feature of the law that should remain. 
If “free counsel” were implemented as a measure to address the high 
cost of due process, then sources of support for non-profit legal 
organizations would need to expand. More government funding, at either the 
federal or state level, would be the most reliable source, if policy makers 
were convinced of the value of appropriating it.93 In today’s climate 
however, with so many unmet needs in public education and limited 
legislative commitment to meet those needs through sufficient public 
funding, the idea of government support for additional special education 
lawyers is not likely on the immediate horizon. Philanthropic and law school 
funding are other potential sources of support. 
Limiting the participation of attorneys in due process proceedings would 
reduce the cost of due process, but this is not an attractive option. As noted 
earlier, enforcement of the special education law is complicated and beyond 
the capacity of most parents. The design of the IDEA incorporates parental 
enforcement as a tool to ensure that schools are offering a free, appropriate 
public education to each child with a disability. Without attorneys to assist 
them, many parents would be unable to bring complaints that help enforce 
the law. Further, nearly all of the parent lawyers, and many of the school 
district lawyers, see the prospect of parents pursuing due process without an 
 
school clinics may only represent persons who are unable financially to pay for legal advice or services. 
27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 1C.0201 (2020). 
92 For example, the Children's Law Clinic at Duke Law School, with which the authors are 
associated, often significantly reduces or waives its claim for fees if the case settles early. 
93 This would be similar to government funding for attorneys in other types of cases, such as 
juveniles, indigent criminal defendants, or parents facing termination of parental rights. 
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attorney as ineffective.94 The widespread use of non-attorney advocates, 
especially without a credentialing system, or a full prohibition on any 
representation, would not seem to serve parents well either, given the skills 
needed to effectively present evidence to meet the burden of proof. Even if 
school districts were not permitted to be represented by attorneys in pro se 
due process cases, those districts would undoubtedly be consulting their 
attorneys behind the scenes, leaving unrepresented parents at a distinct 
disadvantage. Capping attorney fees or eliminating the fee-shifting 
provisions of the IDEA are likewise unappealing, as both approaches would 
discourage private lawyers from developing a special education practice and 
make due process even less accessible than it is already to lower-income 
parents. 
b. Expert Witness Fees 
The second contributor to high costs in due process is the cost of expert 
witnesses. Parent attorneys are nearly unanimous that parents cannot win 
cases without expert witnesses, and half the school board lawyers agree.95 
Experts are required to enable parents to meet their burden of proof (in the 
majority of states that have not shifted that burden to school districts), as 
parents must overcome school district evidence from its staff, whose 
testimony nearly always is given complete credence unless countered by that 
of someone with equivalent expertise. Without fee-shifting provisions for 
expert witness fees,96 these costs must be borne by parents, making these 
fees a significant barrier for parents who wish to pursue due process. 
Congress could address the problem by adding expert-witness fee-
shifting provisions similar to the attorney provisions. This would require 
school districts to reimburse parents for the expert witness fees if the parents 
prevail. The IDEA Fairness Restoration Act,97 which would amend Section 
615(i)(3) of the IDEA to add expert witness fees to the attorney fee-shifting 
provision, has been introduced in Congress on multiple occasions, but never 
passed. Because such an approach is staunchly opposed by school districts,98 
a consensus on such a strategy is not on the horizon. 
Another solution, which could occur at the state level, would be the 
creation of a funding source to pay experts. States could, for example, 
 
94 See supra p. 26. 
95 See supra p. 36-37. 
96 See Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
97 S. 2790, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. (2007). 
98 The National School Boards Association and the American Association of School 
Administrators filed an Amici Curiae brief in the case of Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006), 
expressing strong disagreement with the idea of shifting expert witness fees to school districts when 
parents prevail in due process. Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).  
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establish a fund upon which hearing officers could draw to pay one or more 
independent experts to aid in the resolution of a due process case. Parents 
who wish to use this mechanism rather than privately hire an expert could 
be required to show why an expert is needed and propose the expert of their 
choice, with an opportunity by the school district to show that the proposed 
expert is biased or without the requisite expertise. The hearing officer would 
have the authority to vet the proposed expert for objectivity and authorize a 
reasonable fee. An alternative, but similar approach, could involve a pool of 
pre-certified experts from which either party could draw. These approaches 
might garner common support because they would address the concerns of 
school district lawyers that the parents’ experts are insufficiently 
knowledgeable while still making experts available to the parents. Further, 
if all parties and the hearing officer agreed on the objectivity and expertise 
of the expert, the expert’s opinion would hold great sway; were the expert 
to produce a report prior to the hearing, it could well expedite settlement of 
the case, obviating the need for an extensive, contentious hearing and 
multiple appeals. That result would reduce attorney fees and overall hearing 
costs as well. 
While the creation of new funding streams to pay for lawyers and 
experts for families may be initially disfavored due to the perceived cost, 
policy makers would be well-advised to study how the upfront provision of 
such funds could ultimately decrease the overall cost of special education 
dispute resolution. If that could be shown, it would be money well-spent. 
4. Procedural Simplicity 
A large number of suggestions have been made, both by the attorneys 
responding to this survey and in other forums,99 aimed at reducing the 
procedural complexity of due process. Some propose reforms that would 
alleviate the need to use the due process hearing at all; the most common 
among those proposals is mandatory mediation. Data from the Center for 
Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education (CADRE) show that 
agreements are produced in about two thirds of the cases in which mediation 
is attempted.100 CADRE likewise contends that mediation, along with other 
early dispute resolution mechanisms such as facilitated IEP meetings, are 
more cost-effective and efficient than due process hearings.101 For parties 
who do not reach resolution through mediation, however, a mediation 
requirement would have added time, money, and complexity. In any event, 
 
99 See Mueller, supra note 2.  
100 See Trends in Dispute Resolution Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
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however, this change would require an amendment to the statute; the IDEA 
requires that participation in mediation must be voluntary.102 
Another suggestion to reduce procedural complexity was made by a few 
respondents in states in which there is a two-tiered administrative review 
process: eliminate the state review process. As noted earlier, all but seven 
states use a one-tier review system. Given that most first-tier hearings are 
extensive evidentiary hearings, the value of the second tier is difficult to 
determine. It adds a time-consuming additional step before either party can 
appeal to court. States with two tiers should consider eliminating the second 
tier; they can do this within their current statutory authority. 
Otherwise, despite a seemingly universal wish for more procedural 
simplicity, only limited consensus around workable strategies emerged from 
the survey. This is perhaps because for every procedure that is simplified, 
the parties lose a mechanism for potential advantage. If discovery is limited, 
for example, a route for gaining information is foreclosed. If evidentiary 
rules are relaxed, the possibility of the admission of unreliable testimony and 
the exclusion of necessary testimony increases. Two potential reforms to 
address procedural complexity are imposition of time limits on presentation 
of evidence and a limit to discovery.  
a. Time Limits 
In response to concerns that hearings can be upwards of twenty days, 
the idea of time limits has emerged. New Hampshire, for example, limits 
due process hearings to two days, except for good cause.103 Time limits on 
the presentation of evidence force the parties to focus on the most important 
issues and use their time efficiently. Attorney fees are reduced by shorter 
hearings, so there is a cost reduction as well as increased simplicity. So long 
as the default period is reasonable and an escape valve exists for either party 
to move for additional time in extraordinary circumstances, time limits 
create a strong incentive to the attorneys to crystallize the evidence and 
avoid overly detailed presentations. A limit in the range of three to five days 
would likely be adequate for most due process cases.104  
 
102 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
103 N.H. Code Admin. R. Educ. 1123.02(f) (2021).  
104 The U.S. Department of Education has acknowledged that states can set limits on the time a 
party may spend presenting evidence or questioning witnesses at due process hearings. See B.S. v. Anoka 
Hennepin Pub. Sch., 799 F.3d 1217 (2015) (finding that the ALJ’s limitation of nine hours for each side’s 
evidentiary presentation was not an abuse of discretion and was consistent with Minnesota’s statute); 
Letter from Melody Musgrove, Director, Office of Special Education Programs, to Margaret O’Sullivan 
Kane, Kane Education Law (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with author) (finding that a three-day limit on hearings 
was permitted by the IDEA, which does not address the length of hearings).  




No consensus exists around formal discovery. Our survey results 
showed that in states allowing discovery, the attorneys perceived hearings 
to be more somewhat more complex than in states without discovery. The 
number of attorneys from each state was so small, however, that the results 
cannot be considered statistically valid.105 Nevertheless, the perception that 
discovery adds complexity is intuitively true. The addition of interrogatories, 
depositions, and entry onto property for inspection make due process hearing 
essentially like civil trials. Those processes not only take time, but 
accomplishment of them takes training and skill as well. Each process must 
be planned and executed prior to the hearing; frequently the use by one party 
encourages use by the other party. Multiple survey respondents complained 
that discovery is frequently abused, with attorneys perceiving their 
opponents as intentionally using discovery for the sole purpose of dragging 
out the process and driving up the costs.  
On the other hand, discovery provides a valuable tool, particularly to 
parents, to obtain vital information. In the typical case, for example, the 
parent is attempting to prove that the services provided are not appropriate 
or the child’s setting is not the least restrictive environment. Neither the 
parent nor the parent’s expert has had the daily vantage point that the 
teachers and other school district employees have had. Discovery tools give 
the parent the pre-hearing chance to question potential school witnesses, 
obtain documentary information that is not included in the child’s official 
school records, and observe (or have an expert observe) the child in the 
classroom setting. Without these tools, the parent and the parent’s attorney 
could find themselves heading into the hearing ill-prepared to respond to the 
school district’s case. That lack of advanced knowledge can result in a longer 
hearing, as the parents scramble to react to the evidence presented by the 
school district.106 
Another advantage of discovery is that it can encourage settlement. If 
used appropriately and not abused, discovery allows both sides to fully 
assess the expected evidence and predict the likely outcome of the hearing. 
That knowledge can lead to productive settlement talks, thus alleviating the 
need for a full hearing. Discovery can also lead to stipulations of facts, 
thereby streamlining the presentation of evidence when settlement does not 
occur.  
The majority of states do not allow formal discovery, though some 
 
105 Respondents from states allowing the use of formal discovery in due process hearings reported 
a mean complexity rating of 6.52 out of 10 and a median score of 7 out of 10. In states that do not use 
formal discovery, the mean complexity score was 6.27 and the median was 6. 
106 A rule against discovery can be slightly mitigated by the option to conduct discovery if the case 
is appealed to federal court following the hearing. Parties can request that the record be supplemented 
with information gained from discovery at the court level.  
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give hearing officers discretion to allow it when the need for it is shown.107 
The competing considerations make it difficult to find the right balance. 
While allowing discovery increases the complexity, the information void for 
parents without access to it can significantly limit their opportunity to show 
that their children with disabilities are not being appropriately served. State 
education agencies should at least reconsider their choices on discovery, 
with input from parents, school districts, and special education attorneys, to 
ensure that the hearing process is fair and provides parents an effective 
opportunity to resolve disagreements with the school district. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It seems indisputable that the due process hearing system in place is a 
flawed mechanism for resolving disputes between parents and school 
districts. The many studies and analyses of due process show it to be viewed 
as frustratingly complex, expensive, and time-consuming. Its effectiveness 
at actually resolving the disputes presented is far from clear. Despite varying 
features in participating jurisdictions, the process appears unpopular 
throughout the country. Nevertheless, it has changed little since 1975 when 
it first became part of the system for providing special education to disabled 
students in the United States, despite many calls for amendments over the 
years.108 Our study adds to the voices seeking change, but also adds an 
insight into why change has been so elusive: the opposing sides in the 
dispute, as represented by their lawyers, perceive the flaws very differently. 
Consensus around change is difficult to achieve when the participants 
disagree on the features to be amended, and, as reflected in our study, display 
limited mutual trust.  
Continued push for change is merited regardless of its challenge. Here, 
we have focused on a few efforts that, based on the views expressed in the 
survey, could garner agreement on both sides. First, we encourage state 
education agencies to revisit their policies with regard to hiring, training, 
and paying hearing officers. Across the board, attorneys felt that better 
qualified and trained hearing officers would foster more efficient and 
effective hearings. Second, we encourage the agencies to review their 
procedural rules to make them clearer, more comprehensive, and more 
accessible. Complete and more explicit rules, leaving fewer procedures to 
the discretion of hearing officers, can make the hearing process more 
uniform and predictable for parents and school districts alike. Finally, we 
believe serious efforts should be pursued to find sources for the payment of 
necessary expert witnesses and to expand free or low-cost legal 
 
107 See earlier discussion, supra note 49. 
108 See, e.g., Shaver, supra note 6; Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How 
IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education 
Lawyering, 20 Am. U. J. Gender So. Pol’y & L. 107 (2011). 
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representation for parents. Availability of both has the potential to bring 
down the overall cost of due process and increase parental accessibility to 
dispute resolution, which is one of the cornerstones of the IDEA. While 
more needs to be done to improve the due process experience for both 
parents and school districts, we believe these efforts could enhance IDEA 
dispute resolution for all. 
